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Abstract 
I reply to the commentaries of Parkinson (2013), de Sousa (2013), and Frijda (2013) 
discussing the transactional nature of appraisal, the presumably overinclusive definition of 
appraisal, and the cognitive nature of appraisal.   
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In reply to the commentaries of Parkinson (2013) and de Sousa (2013), I discuss the 
transactional nature of appraisal, the presumably overinclusive definition of appraisal, and the 
cognitive nature of appraisal. I also briefly touch on the scientific status of the notion of 
causation.  
Appraisal is Transactional 
As explained in Moors (2013), emotions occur when a sufficient set of necessary conditions is 
in place, such as the stimulus, goals, coping potential, and expectations. The stimulus is 
traditionally appointed as “the cause” or “the remote cause”, whereas the other conditions are 
often viewed as “background or enabling conditions” because the stimulus is the thing that 
changes from a time when the emotion was absent to a time when the emotion is present. 
Selecting “a cause” from the set of necessary conditions is a subjective matter; objectively 
speaking, the stimulus should not receive a special status because the other conditions are just 
as necessary. In this sense, the notion of causation can be called non-scientific (de Sousa, 
2013). Yet searching for a sufficient set of necessary conditions (without attributing a special 
status to one of them) does not strike me as particularly non-scientific. 
Appraisal theories are genuinely transactional in that they argue that stimuli must be 
combined with goals and other types of information to produce an emotion. But appraisal 
theories go further by adding two points. First, they conjecture that the proximal cause of 
emotions is an appraisal process (with as a minimal output goal relevance and/or urgency). It 
is not sufficient that a stimulus is objectively goal relevant; it must also be appraised as such 
(i.e., subjectively). Put differently, appraisal theorists assume the existence of a process that 
does the actual transaction and this process is called appraisal. How to empirically investigate 
this idea is a different matter. Appraisal is a mental process that cannot be observed directly 
but needs to be derived from observable responses. But these responses are often considered 
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to be part of the emotion itself. So establishing appraisal independent of the rest of the 
emotion is a difficult challenge.     
A second point is that appraisal theories try to identify the other conditions that enter 
in the transaction besides the stimulus, such as goals, coping potential, expectations, and the 
cause of the stimulus. Identifying these other factors is a work in progress. Transactional 
theories of all kinds (those that do and those that do not assume the existence of a process of 
transaction or appraisal) could team up to map out the various conditions involved in emotion 
causation.    
Is Appraisal Defined too Broadly? 
I defined appraisal on a functional level of analysis as something that relates the 
stimulus and other conditions to an appraisal output (i.e., values on appraisal variables).  
Because the restrictions of what does and does not count as an appraisal process are cast at the 
functional level, this leaves much freedom regarding the potential underlying mechanisms on 
the algorithmic level. Although the definition is indeed very broad on the algorithmic level, it 
is not broad on the functional level. Not all kinds of information lead to emotions. That the set 
of appraisal variables is not fixed but a work in progress should not be held against appraisal 
theories. It is a feature of healthy theories that they are open to adjustment and refinement. 
That the definition is broad (although not all-inclusive) in terms of potential underlying 
mechanisms is not a reason for rejection either. Appraisal theories choose to define appraisal 
on a functional level, not because in this way it can creep into every whole or wrap itself 
around every tree. It is because defining concepts on other levels of analysis is highly 
problematic (see De Houwer, Barnes-Holmes, & Moors, 2012), not in the least because 
diagnosing the operation of a particular mechanism (e.g., associative, rule-based) is 
notoriously difficult (cf. Moors, 2010).   
Is Appraisal Cognitive? 
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I have specifically avoided to call appraisal a cognitive process because the latter still 
carries with it the connotation that it is high level (e.g., conscious, rule-based, propositional). 
My own definition of cognitive processes as ones that are mediated by or result in 
representations is much broader and appraisal defined as a process resulting in representations 
of appraisal values falls within these boundaries. Representation, minimally defined as 
something we need in order to explain variable input-output relations, does not imply any 
high level qualities, nor that the values are integrated in some kind of core relational theme. 
Thus, I am not certain that when Gibson (1997) argued that the affordance qualities of stimuli 
can drive behavior without cognition, he has the same broad definition of cognition in mind as 
I do.  
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